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Public pressure versus lobbying – how do Environmental 
NGOs matter most in climate negotiations? 
 
Katharina Rietig1 
 
Abstract  
 
Advocacy nongovernmental organizations have the largest influence on the outcome of 
climate negotiations when they mobilize public pressure in collaboration with the media. 
Environmental NGOs can pursue insider strategies by joining government delegations as 
advisors or pursue outsider strategies as either lobbyists inside the negotiation venue or 
as activists. This article presents an analytical framework that can determine the influ-
ence of NGO outsider-strategies on climate change conferences based on indicators. In-
fluence for NGOs within the conference center depends on their policy entrepreneurial 
strategies, their representatives’ personal capabilities, how early in the negotiation cycle 
they are active and if they gain insider status with government delegations. As lobbyists 
remain outsiders, their influence remains usually low. Advocacy NGOs also strive to in-
fluence climate negotiations from outside the conference center with demonstrations. 
Their influence depends on a clear message, favorable media coverage, a critical mass 
representing a majority of voters and peaceful protest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: 
Environmental NGO, influence, lobbying, activists, demonstrations, climate change, 
UNFCCC                                                         
1 Acknowledgement: I am grateful to Wilfried Bolewski, Dieter Kerwer and Michael Mason for their 
comments and feedback. 
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Introduction  
 
State representatives struggle at United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations to agree on a post-2012 treaty to succeed the ex-
piring first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. The highly complex negotiations 
face many challenges including incompatible political positions, economic development 
considerations, debates on climate justice and historic responsibilities as well as a nego-
tiation deadlock based on institutional veto points.2 Nongovernmental actors gained con-
siderable influence in national and international decision-making3 although they are 
formally only observers at United Nations conferences.4 Many analyses focus on the in-
creasing number of NGOs participating in international environmental negotiations and 
their activities.5 One frequently used example is how Environmental NGOs (ENGOs) 
decisively contributed to drafting UNFCCC at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 by partici-
pating in government delegations, lobbying, building public pressure and contributing to 
content and structure of the negotiation text.6  
Which strategies available to advocacy NGOs are most effective to influence in-
ternational climate change negotiations? Following a categorization of insider and out-
sider NGOs in relation to their distinct strategies and a brief review of previous contribu-
tions on evaluating NGO influence in environmental negotiations, this article examines 
the objectives and roles of ENGOs at UNFCCC.                                                          
2 For detailed analyses on regime theory and the UNFCCC negotiations see Depledge 2005; Falkner, 
Stephan and Vogel 2010; Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger 2000; Keohane and Victor 2010. 
3 Albin 1999; Andonova, Betsill and Bulkeley 2009; Arts 1998; Auer 2000; Bulkeley and Newell 2010; 
Depledge 2005; Gullberg 2008; Gulbrandsen and Andresen 2004; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Matthews 
1997; Najam 1998; Newell 2000; Princen and Finger 1994; Stone 2000; Wapner 1995; Yamin 2001; and 
Yamin and Depledge 2004. 
4 In United Nations negotiations, the only legitimate negotiation parties are sovereign states. Nongovern-
mental actors are admitted to the negotiation setting as observers with access restricted to the corridors, 
plenary sessions and some contact groups. Observers must be non-profit organizations and have no vote 
(UNFCCC 1996). This status poses a considerable challenge for influencing negotiations (Betsill and Co-
rell 2008a, 6). 
5 Carpenter 2001; Depledge 2005; Newell 2000; Yamin 2001; and Yamin and Depledge 2004. 
6 Mathews 1997, 55. 
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This article contributes to the ongoing academic project of qualitatively evaluat-
ing the effectiveness of NGOs with an analysis of the outsider-strategies lobbying and 
public pressure at the example of Environmental NGOs (ENGOs) between 2009 and 
2011 with a focus on the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference of 2009. Based on 
empirical data, it develops a refined theoretical framework that qualitatively measures 
the influence of NGOs using outsider-strategies in climate negotiations with four central 
indicators. Influence for NGOs within the conference center – i.e. as lobbyists, advisors 
– depends on their policy entrepreneurial strategies, their representatives’ personal capa-
bilities, how early in the negotiation cycle they are active and if they gain insider status 
with government delegations. Central determinants for the effectiveness of demonstra-
tions are a clear message, peaceful protest, a critical mass of people representing the ma-
jority of voters and, most importantly, favorable media coverage. NGOs influence cli-
mate negotiations differently, depending on their roles, capabilities and timing.  
 
 
Analytical framework to evaluate NGO influence in climate change negotiations 
 
 Considerable progress has been achieved over the last decade on the ongoing ac-
ademic project of describing, categorizing and evaluating the roles, strategies, capabili-
ties and influence of NGOs at international environmental negotiations. The first phase 
saw general observations of increasing ENGO activities and influence but fell short of 
presenting empirical evidence which distinguished clearly between influence on the pro-
cess and/or outcome of the negotiations.7 Scholars turned to evaluating the influence of                                                         
7 See discussion at Betsill and Corell 2001. Pioneer contributions include Mathews 1997; Najam 1998; 
Raustiala 1998. This article follows the definition of influence provided by Corell and Betsill (2008, 24) 
as “influence occurs when one actor intentionally communicates to another so as to alter the latter’s be-
havior from what would have occurred otherwise”. 
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NGOs on specific issues in one or several negotiation sessions based on a qualitative 
theoretical framework developed by Michele Betsill and Elizabeth Corell.8 This section 
evaluates the their latest contribution and proposes a theoretical addition to their frame-
work relevant for advocacy NGOs that undertake ‘outsider’ lobbying and/or mass pro-
tests.  
 
Review of the theoretical framework proposed by Betsill and Corell 
Betsill and Corell presented a theoretical framework in 2008 as a tool to qualita-
tively measure the influence of NGOs in the categories low, moderate and high.9 The 
framework was tested by several empirical studies of international environmental nego-
tiations.10 It differentiates between NGO influence on the negotiation process and on the 
negotiation outcome. Three indicators for influence are central to evaluate the influence 
of a NGO constituency11 such as ENGOs on the negotiations: First, how the NGOs con-
tributed to framing the issue under examination, second their impact during agenda set-
ting, i.e. if they managed to include or exclude topics from the negotiation agenda, and 
third if they were successful in influencing the negotiation position of key states.  
Evidence is gathered through process tracing communication from the NGO 
representatives to government delegates. The NGO constituencies’ influence on the 
examined issue is low if there is no evidence for changes in the influence indicators. A 
change in the process indicators demonstrates moderate influence. If NGOs were 
successful in shaping the negotiation outcome or increase their role through being 
                                                        
8 The initial framework was presented in 2001 (Betsill and Corell 2001) and prompted responses from 
Andanova 2008; and Gulbrandsen and Andresen 2004. 
9 Betsill and Corell 2008. 
10 Andresen and Skodvin 2008; Betsill 2008a; Betsill 2008b; Betsill and Corell 2008; Betsill and Corell 
2008a; Betsill and Corell 2008b; Corell, 2008; Corell and Betsill 2001; Burgiel 2008; and Humphreys 
2008. 
11 UNFCCC 2010b. 
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entrusted with implementation, their influence on the issue is high.12 This analytical 
framework provides excellent tools in the form of questions to process trace and 
evaluate the influence of one or more NGO constituencies on one issue in environmental 
negotiations. However, the analysis is limited to broad indicators that do not directly 
allow for clear cut distinctions between different strategies, actors, roles and when in the 
negotiation cycle NGOs try to influence the negotiations. The framework furthermore 
does not distinguish between insider- and outsider-strategies used by NGOs to influence 
the negotiations. As the evaluation remains focused on low, moderate and high influence 
somewhat undifferentiated, there is scope to further refine the framework by opening the 
remaining “black box”. Betsill concluded on the necessity to work towards tools that 
allow comparability of NGO influence across cases.13 The following sections present a 
refinement of this theoretical framework, allowing an evaluation of the influence of 
NGOs using outsider-strategies such as lobbying and organizing mass protests.  
Methodology 
This article contributes to the endeavor of achieving comparability across cases 
regarding NGOs who pursue outsider-strategies by adding indicators that allow evaluat-
ing influence based on strategies, roles, capabilities and timing.14 It tests these indicators 
with empirical data on ENGO influence from the UNFCCC negotiations from 2009 
leading up to the Conference of the Parties-15 (COP-15) in Copenhagen until the pre-
paratory meeting for COP-17 in South Africa held in Bonn in June 2011. The data col-
lection followed the theoretical framework proposed by Betsill and Corell.15 The analy-
                                                        
12 Corell and Betsill, 2008. 
13 Betsill 2008, 184ff. 
14 An evaluation of insider-strategies based on four categories of influence (policy-entrepreneurial strate-
gies, network to government delegates/insider-access, personal capabilities and timing, i.e. when in the 
negotiation cycle experts provide input, at the example of academics at the UNFCCC negotiations 2009-
2011 can be found elsewhere (Rietig, 2011). 
15 Betsill and Corell 2008. 
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sis is based on a process tracing of NGO influence from ENGO delegates to government 
representatives. From 2009 to 2011, the author conducted 28 interviews with govern-
ment delegates (at least two representatives from each negotiation bloc), 11 interviews 
with ENGO delegates, a survey with 51 detailed responses in the quality of structured 
interviews (25 from ENGOs)16 and observed 85 contact groups, plenary sessions, infor-
mal meetings, briefings by the chairs to civil society, constituency meetings, press con-
ferences and demonstrations.17  
 
Insider- or outsider status determines available strategies  
 
NGOs use insider- and outsider-strategies as means to influence negotiations.18 
Advisory NGOs pursue insider-strategies as members of government delegations or are 
at least in close contact with the negotiators as policy advisors and experts on technical 
issues. As insiders, nongovernmental actors are valued by government delegates for 
their neutrality, constructive contributions and expertise.19  
Advocacy NGOs pursue insider-strategies as well as outsider-strategies. What 
strategy they use is determined by their capabilities such as financial resources, mem-
bership base, and especially relevant for insider-strategies the intellectual base and the 
political base in the form of networks to government representatives.20 Outsider-
strategies describe activities that aim at influencing multilateral decision-making from 
outside the circle of decision-makers such as mass protests, campaigning, strategic use 
                                                        
16 See Appendix 1 for the full interview list and Appendix 2 for the survey questions; survey, 7/2010, 
London, LSE. 
17 UNFCCC negotiations Barcelona 11/2009, Copenhagen 12/2009, Bonn 4/2010 and Bonn 06/2011. 
18 Gulbransen and Andresen 2004. 
19 Japan, 12/12/2009; and Research and Independent NGO (RINGO), 14/12/2009; see also Haas 1992; 
and Auer 1998. 
20 Gulbransen and Andresen 2004, 56f. Evidence from 2009-2011 confirms that advisory nongovernmen-
tal actors such as academics primarily pursue insider strategies (Rietig, 2011). 
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of, and alliances with media to influence the public. The objective is to put public pres-
sure on governments and elected officials. NGOs also pursue semi-outsider strategies 
such as lobbying. When nongovernmental actors lobby government delegates, they have 
access to the negotiation setting (at least to the corridors), but they are not trusted mem-
bers of a government delegation with access to the smaller negotiation groups such as 
“friends of the chair” or informal groups, where the actual negotiations take place. In-
stead, NGOs communicate to government delegates what issues or formulations they 
want to include by providing them with draft text.21  
 
 
Influence of NGO lobbyists using outsider-strategies 
 
Not all NGOs and strategies influence the negotiations equally. Lobbyists oper-
ate inside the conference center but they remain outsiders to the government delegations. 
Like Research and Independent NGOs, the influence of ENGO lobbyists operating in-
side the conference center depends on (1) personal capabilities, (2) policy-
entrepreneurial strategies, (3) whether they achieve insider status with government dele-
gations based on their access to key delegations and (4) the stage in the negotiation cycle 
they try to provide input to the negotiations.22 Figure 1 illustrates the prerequisites and 
indicators for exerting influence inside the conference center.  
                                                        
21 Survey, 7/2010, London, LSE; Youth NGO activist, 14/12/2009; CAN Canada, 13/12/2009; President 
of ENGO’s national European division on lobbying activities, 17/12/2009; Senior member of strategic 
planning committee of CAN, 14/12/2009; Lawyer in CAN legal unit, 16/12/2009; Young Greens Europe, 
12/12/2009; Experienced YOUNGO, 11/06/2011. 
22 Rietig, 2011. 
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Figure 1. Indicators to determine influence inside the conference center. Source: Rietig 2011. 
 
Indicator Evidence  
Prerequisite for influence: 
 
• Access to negotiation setting 
• Opportunity to communicate position and to be heard by government del-
egates 
• Be informed about recent developments in negotiations and key govern-
ment’s positions 
• Expertise on negotiation topics (have something to contribute), interna-
tional standing and recognition as expert  
 
Additional factors: 
 
- Timing: Communication with government before national position is  
decided 
 
- Insider Status:  
• Member of delegation 
• Access to informal negotiations 
• Access to negotiation text 
• Access to and consulting of decision makers  
a) before and  
b) at high level segment 
 
- Policy-entrepreneurial strategies (proactive, networks, build coalitions) 
 
- Personal capabilities (relevant expertise and ability to present expertise 
successfully to government delegates) 
 
 
Yes/No 
Yes/No 
 
Yes/No 
 
Yes/No 
 
 
 
 
Early/Late 
 
 
High/Low 
Yes/No 
Yes/No 
Yes/No 
 
Yes/No 
Yes/No 
 
Active/  
Inactive 
 
High/ Low 
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 This framework allows determination of the influence of NGO delegates who 
take on a lobbyist role. It is also valid for advisors and observers.23 Figure 2 visualizes a 
qualitative measure of the influence of NGOs working within the conference center. If 
the levels of influence on the four indicator scales are linked with each other, a figure 
emerges. The larger the area under this figure, the higher the NGO influence on the ne-
gotiation. The larger diamond consequently reflects high influence on the negotiations 
and the small diamond low influence, depending on the strategies, capabilities, timing 
and status of the individual NGO delegate.  
 
Figure 2. Indicators to determine low/moderate/high influence: 
- Timing in the negotiation cycle (the earlier the better) 
- Personal capabilities (the more expert and established, the better),  
- Policy-entrepreneurial strategies (the more active and engaged networker  
  with creative ideas, the better) 
- Insider (the more senior within powerful delegation, the better) 
Source: Rietig, 2011. 
 
                                                         
23 Rietig, 2011. 
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Activists: the power of mass protest 
 
NGOs using outsider-strategies can not only influence climate change negotia-
tions from inside the conference center as lobbyists or advisors, but also from the out-
side by organizing and participating in mass protests.24 The following section focuses on 
the leverage NGOs gain from organizing protests and mass demonstrations. Under cer-
tain conditions, demonstrations can be a powerful tool to present expectations and de-
mands from governments, push for ambitious action and voice citizens’ concerns about 
climate change. The central strategy of activist NGOs is to make as much “noise”25 as 
possible, both inside and outside the conference center, to achieve change by putting de-
cision makers under pressure to act.  
 The influence of activist NGOs on climate negotiations can be assessed with four 
indicators. Prerequisites for influence are the existence of an organizational base for pro-
test. This includes first shared concerns and objectives, second the existence of a trans-
national advocacy network26 that can provide the necessary expertise, organizational ca-
pabilities, political-, information-, strategic- and leverage-power including established or 
ad-hoc emerging communication channels. Given these prerequisites are fulfilled, four 
indicators determine the influence of activist NGOs on climate change negotiations. 
First, the demonstrations must be peaceful to be framed positively. Peacefulness grants 
protesters legitimacy and protects them from being branded as criminals. Second, the                                                         
24 The analytical framework is based on data triangulated from the following sources: Interview with 
Youth NGO activist, 14/12/2009; CAN Canada, 13/12/2009; President of national European division of 
lobbying activities, 17/12/2009; Senior member of CAN strategic planning committee, 14/12/2009; Law-
yer in CAN legal unit, 16/12/2009; Young Greens Europe, 12/12/2009; Experienced YOUNGO, 
11/06/2011; Gore 2009; Kerry 2009; Robinson 2009; Survey, 7/2010; and 25 valid ENGO responses, 
London, LSE; and participant observation at briefings by the chairs to civil society, demonstrations inside 
and outside the conference centers, personal communication at UNFCCC in November 2009 (Barcelona), 
December 2009 (Copenhagen), April 2010 (Bonn) and June 2011 (Bonn). 
25 Briefing of AWG-LCA chair to civil society, 4/2011; Christina Figueres, UNFCCC Executive Secretary 
at briefing to civil society, 6/2011; and Survey, 7/2011, London, LSE. 
26 A transnational advocacy network consists of NGOs sharing the same norms, values and objectives; see 
Keck and Sikkink, 1998.  
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demonstrations must receive high media attention and be covered favorably. Third, 
NGOs must have clear, simple messages and demands. Fourth, to be taken seriously by 
politicians and governments, they need to mobilize a critical mass of people who repre-
sent the majority of voters. Figure 3 summarizes the indicators to determine the influ-
ence of activists, using outsider strategies. 
 
Figure 3. Indicators to determine influence of activists using outsider-strategies.  
Compiled by author. 
Indicator Evidence 
 
Prerequisite for influence: 
Organizational base for protest 
 
• Shared concern and objectives 
• Transnational Advocacy Network 
• Established or ad-hoc communication channels 
 
Additional factors: 
- Peaceful Protest 
- Favorable media coverage 
- Clear message 
- Critical mass representing majority of voters 
 
 
Yes/No 
 
Yes/No 
Yes/No 
Yes/No 
 
 
Yes/No 
Yes/No 
Yes/No 
Yes/No 
  
The four indicators can be qualitatively measured on a scale that, by connecting 
the relative influence measures, results in a diamond-shaped figure. The larger the area 
of the figure, the higher is the NGO influence. A small or asymmetric figure indicates 
low to moderate influence. The influence is large, when NGOs mobilize a critical mass 
representing the majority of voters, there is high and favorable media coverage, clear 
messages are being sent and protest remains peaceful. The low extreme of the scale 
would be violent protest, low media attention, a small crowd of people that represents 
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minority interests and an unclear, complicated message or even no message at all. Figure 
4 summarizes the scale of activist influence. 
 
Figure 4. Criteria with scale of influence of activist NGOs. Compiled by author.  
 
 
 This section has presented an analytical framework useful to supplement the 
Betsill/Corell 2008-framework on assessing NGO influence on climate negotiations. It 
provides a supplement by linking influence to NGO strategies and capabilities. Depend-
ing on a NGOs’ outsider-strategy of either lobbying or organizing/participating in mass 
demonstrations, influence is based on their score on the influence indicators.  
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Influence of Environmental NGOs at the Climate Change Conference 2009  
 
The following section analyses the influence of ENGOs on the UNFCCC negoti-
ations between 2009 and 2011 with a focus on the climate change conference in Copen-
hagen 2009. It tests both the analytical framework of NGO influence by Betsill and Co-
rell27 and the addition to the framework proposed above to conclude on the central re-
search question of when, how and under what circumstances ENGOs influenced the 
UNFCCC negotiations between 2009 and 2011.  
 
The objectives of Environmental NGOs within the Climate Action Network 
 
To increase their influence by speaking with one voice and pool resources, EN-
GOs are grouped together in the Climate Action Network (CAN), which consists of an 
activist and a lobbyist branch. NGOs who share similar values and objectives frequently 
combine their resources and efforts by organizing as transnational advocacy network.28  
CAN is such a transnational advocacy network and includes most ENGOs at 
UNFCCC conferences. The CAN network allows ENGOs to pool their resources and 
knowledge to gain higher leverage for their common objectives and to focus on two dis-
tinct strategies. One branch of CAN engages in lobbying government delegates within 
the conference center while the other branch pools together the resources of activist 
NGOs for demonstrations. CAN emerged in 1989 when 63 ENGOs grouped together be-
fore the Second World Climate Conference with the common value of sustainable de-
velopment.29 Local, national and international ENGOs collaborate in CAN to achieve 
their shared objectives by engaging with government representatives, either by collabo-                                                        
27 Betsill and Corell, 2008. 
28 Keck and Sikkink 1998, 1. 
29 CAN, 2011; Mc Gregor 2099; and Newell 2000, 126. 
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rating with them or putting external pressure on governments if positions diverge.30 Cen-
tral actors in CAN are Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, but also newer activist ENGOs 
such as Avaaz and 350.org, who mobilized millions of people around the world in 
demonstrations and awareness-raising campaigns. They demanded a strong legally bind-
ing deal that would limit temperature increase to 1.5 degrees and CO2 in the atmosphere 
to 350ppm. This should be achieved by reducing GHG emissions by 40 percent from 
1990 levels in industrialized countries and overall reduced per capita emissions. Central 
further demands are closing loopholes in carbon trading and a well-equipped fund for fi-
nancing adaptation measures in developing countries.31  
 
Evaluation of ENGO influence with the Betsill/Corell framework 
 
The results of tracing the influence of ENGOs between 2009 and 2011 based on 
the Betsill/Corell framework indicate low influence.32 Except for contributing to how the 
problem of climate change is framed, they were not able to influence the agenda-setting 
or shape the positions of key states. They were unable in increase their importance by 
being called upon as important actors for implementing decisions. The Copenhagen Ac-
cords33 were negotiated by a small group of heads of states, which left no room for EN-
GOs to directly shape the outcome of the conference.  
While most states regarded climate change as a challenge and demanded an ef-
fective post-2012 climate treaty, they were unable to agree on the implementation of this 
goal and barely changed their negotiation position. Although there was a shift in gov-
ernment representatives’ views that a treaty is necessary, each negotiation bloc had its                                                         
30 ENGOs especially target industrialized countries, see Newell 2000, 126; for a detailed analysis on NGO 
– government coalitions in the sphere of lobbying depending on the position see Gullberg 2008. 
31 Survey, 7/2010, London, LSE. 
32 Corell and Betsill, 2008. 
33 UNFCCC 2009. 
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own interpretations of this common goal based on individual interests. ENGOs used lev-
erage and symbolic politics34 by emotionalizing information on climate impacts provid-
ed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) with memorable exam-
ples such as drowning polar bears. Many government representatives’ view changed 
over the past years due to increased public awareness and concern, which can be traced 
back to ENGO’s information campaigns to a certain extent. Consequently, ENGOs in-
fluenced the negotiation positions of government delegations by communicating the ur-
gency of the climate change threat.  
However, ENGO influence was limited as they failed to change the negotiation 
positions G20 states. The most powerful negotiation parties reinterpreted the IPCC tar-
get according to their political objectives.35 They agreed in the Copenhagen Accords on 
the target to reduce emissions to 450ppm, thereby limiting the global temperature in-
crease to 2°C,36 while ENGOs and most developing countries demanded the target of 
350ppm or 1.5°C temperature increase to save island states from rising sea levels and 
limit the loss of biodiversity. However, commonalities in the demands of ENGOs and 
developing countries were based on common references to the IPCC report’s conclu-
sions rather than on ENGO influence. There is also no evidence that ENGOs had a sig-
nificant influence on setting the agenda, which was shaped by states and resulted from 
the topics discussed in the Ad-hoc working groups. Overall, ENGO representatives re-
garded their influence on the process indicators37 and the conference as low.   
ENGOs also failed to influence the outcome of the negotiations according to 
their own evaluation and government representatives’ conclusions in the form of provid-
ing formulations that were reflected in the final document, both the UN Resolution tak-                                                        
34 Keck and Sikkink 1998. 
35 Keck and Sikkink 1998, 25ff. 
36 IPCC 2007. 
37 Betsill and Corell, 2008. 
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ing note of the Copenhagen Accords, or the Copenhagen Accords themselves. Further-
more, ENGOs did not succeed in increasing their participation in future negotiations; 
however this did not seem to be a focus of their activities.  
The central obstacle for influencing the negotiation outcome was the lack of ac-
cess to the heads of states as key decision makers. Even when ENGO representatives 
were accepted into government delegations as insiders and had access to the negotiation 
text in the Ad-hoc working groups, they were not able to effectively influence the deci-
sions of the heads of states as they discarded the prepared negotiation text. Furthermore, 
most ENGO delegates who managed to join government delegations as advisors were in 
developing country delegations who already shared their objectives and profited from 
ENGO expertise. In the case of the Copenhagen Accords, even the most senior ENGO 
advisors in developing country delegations were excluded from influencing the negotia-
tion text together with their heads of states waiting in the plenary hall for progress 
among the G20 states drafting the text. 
Consequently, the overall influence of ENGOs on the negotiations was low ac-
cording to the influence indicators proposed by the Betsill/Corell analytical framework, 
although ENGOs succeeded in communicating their positions to government delegates, 
who received their input but did not carry it on into the negotiation text. One major addi-
tional factor besides the decoupling of the diplomat level and the negotiations among the 
heads of states was that government delegates perceived ENGOs as biased towards their 
advocacy position and not as neutral experts. The research results on the negotiations be-
tween 2009 and 2011 support Betsill’s conclusion that the influence of NGOs is lower in 
negotiations on follow-up protocols as they require specific pledges and implementation 
instead of abstract declarations open to interpretation.38  
                                                        
38 Betsill 2008, 194ff. 
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Indicator-based measuring of influence for ENGOs using outsider-strategies 
 
Although the Betsill/Corell analytical framework is very useful to determine the 
overall influence of NGOs, there is scope for differentiation. It does not distinguish be-
tween insider- and outsider-strategies or different capabilities. Opening up the black box 
of ENGO influence in 2009-2011 reveals that some ENGOs had more influence than 
others based on their strategies, capabilities and when in the negotiation cycle they ap-
proached government delegates: different ENGO delegates used different strategies, 
which determined their individual influence. Apart from successful insider-strategies as 
advisors who join government delegations,39 most ENGO delegates use outsider-
strategies. As members of advocacy NGOs, they either lobby government delegates ask-
ing them to adopt ENGO objectives or they demonstrate as activists. The following sec-
tions first evaluate the outsider-influence of observers, second the outsider-influence of 
lobbyists, and third ENGOs organizing or participating in demonstrations. These are ei-
ther small-scale demonstrations inside the conference venue targeted at negotiators or 
mass demonstrations with media coverage targeted at influencing governments and top-
level decision makers. This evaluation along the lines of strategies contributes to an im-
proved comparability of NGO influence across constituencies and single issues. 
 
Observers of the negotiation process 
The majority of NGO delegates in general, and ENGOs in particular, observes 
the negotiations to network with other NGO representatives or government delegates, 
report back to their organization, learn about best-practice in mitigation and adaptation 
                                                        
39 Insider-strategies are discussed at Rietig, 2011. 
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by visiting side events and to gain a better understanding of the negotiations.40 Both 
classic observers and lobbyists populate the corridors, side events, cafés and plenary 
halls of the conference center during UNFCCC negotiations, but they are excluded from 
the actual negotiations, which take place in the form of informal groups and contact 
groups behind closed doors guarded by UN security personnel. Observers are the classic 
role envisioned by the United Nations.41 Figure 4 illustrates the low influence of observ-
ers between 2009-2011 symbolized by the small diamond shape as they have an outsider 
status, limited use of policy entrepreneurial strategies, limited expertise and enter the 
negotiation setting very late after the national positions have already been decided. 
 
Figure 4. Low influence of observers. Compiled by author based on Rietig 2011. 
 
                                                        
40 Survey, 7/2010, London, LSE. 
41 UNFCCC 1996. 
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Strategies and influence of environmental lobbyists  
 
Like classic observers, environmental lobbyists are working within the negotiation 
venue but remain outsiders to the actual negotiations due to their status as nongovern-
mental observer. This crucial criterion distinguishes the environmental lobbyist from the 
advisor, whose network is good enough to join government delegations and thereby cir-
cumvent the access restrictions to the actual negotiations experienced by the environ-
mental lobbyist.  
“The high-level delegates are very cold and block every contact. They are not ap-
proachable and do want to be left alone. They do not even want to engage in a dia-
logue about the issue with us.”42  
 
Environmental lobbyists have a very limited influence on the negotiations according 
to government representatives.43 There are several reasons for this. First, as lobbyists 
they advocate a certain position, i.e. they demand something from the government repre-
sentatives but have little to offer in return. Consequently, their position is communicated 
and received by the government representatives; however the latter see no reason to act 
upon the input and adapt their position unless the environmental lobbyist has considera-
ble bargaining power and resources at hand. In contrast to business and industry repre-
sentatives, who in fact have high financial capabilities and are central partners in the im-
plementation of climate agreements, few environmental NGOs have this leverage pow-
er.44 However, if they possess the capabilities of high expertise and excellent network-
ing, government delegates value them. This enables lobbyists to become advisors, either 
in close contact to the government delegation or even as member. They do not need to                                                         
42 Interview with CAN Canada delegate, 17/12/2009, Copenhagen, UNFCCC. 
43 Interview with AOSIS, 10/4/2010; EU, 10/4/2010; Germany, 12/12/2009; Japan, 12/12/2009; Latin 
America, 11/4/2010; United Arab Emirates, 12/12/2009; Umbrella Group, 11/4/2011; Vanuatu, 
17/12/2009; and participant observation.  
44 For detailed lobbying strategies, see Bilouri 1999; and Vormedal 2008 for the leverage and capabilities 
of Business and Industry NGOs. 
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lobby the delegates anymore as a two-way street of communication and mutual appre-
ciation is established.  
A core indicator is when in the negotiation process environmental lobbyists ap-
proach government representatives. All government delegates interviewed agreed that 
once the negotiation position has been decided by the national decision-making body, 
usually the parliament, the position cannot be changed, regardless how hard NGOs try to 
lobby them. Figure 5 visualizes the low influence of environmental lobbyists. 
 
Figure 5. Low influence of environmental lobbyists. Compiled by author based on Rietig 2011. 
 
 
 
 
As outsiders to the actual negotiations, the score of environmental lobbyists on the 
‘insider’ indicator is low. Unless they already lobbied national governments before the 
national negotiation position was decided in parliament and the regional negotiation 
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bloc, their score on the timing indicator is also low. Environmental lobbyists frequently 
take great personal efforts to make a difference and are very entrepreneurial in how they 
approach government delegates. ENGO delegates working in the lobbying section of 
CAN prepare detailed lobbying strategies, coordinate their efforts in daily coordination 
meetings over several hours and even lobby government delegates at the hotel bar at 
2am in the morning or stay at the conference center if the negotiations continue into the 
night.45 In the case of lobbying by ENGOs the costs of personal effort, lost sleep, attend-
ing COPs and coordinating lobbying strategies does not match the benefits from lobby-
ing government delegates in the form of influence on the high-level-negotiations, neither 
on the process nor the outcome. This is especially the case when ENGOs lobby govern-
ment delegations whose negotiation position does not match the objectives of the EN-
GOs. If ENGOs lobby delegations whose position they share, they quickly move from 
the lobbyist role to the advisory role as delegations welcome the expertise and technical 
input to their work on capacity building.  
 
Effectiveness of demonstrations 
 
The process tracing to government representatives yields a differentiated evalua-
tion of the effectiveness of demonstrations organized by ENGOs. The direct influence of 
demonstrations on government delegates is low. Unless demonstrations continue over 
weeks with millions of participants, government delegates perceive them as disturbing 
background noise and security issue, but not as reason enough to get into contact with 
their home government attempting to change the negotiation position.46 
                                                        
45 Participant observation in December 2009 (Copenhagen) and June 2011 (Bonn). 
46 Interview AOSIS, 10/4/2010, Bonn, UNFCCC; EU delegate 10/4/2010; Japan, 12/12/2009; Latin Amer-
ica, 11/4/2011; and Umbrella Group, 11/4/2011. 
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However, the indirect influence via the media can be considerable. Media repre-
sentatives reporting about the negotiations in their home countries are very thankful for 
the demonstrations by ENGOs and their youth organizations as they paint a lively pic-
ture of the negotiations. Examples include green aliens asking for ‘climate leaders’ giv-
en the lack of leadership on ambitious targets, ticking alarm clocks symbolizing the ur-
gency of the climate crisis and a fake New York Times copy pre-dated to the last day of 
COP-15 with headlines of a strong, legally binding deal limiting global temperature in-
crease to 1.5°C agreed by the US and China.47 
ENGOs with millions of members can affect public opinion via mass demonstra-
tions and the media, thereby pressuring democratic governments with consequences in 
the next elections. An example where ENGOs effectively use tactics of leverage and ac-
countability politics is the daily Fossil of the Day Award ceremony at larger UNFCCC 
COPs and intersessional meetings. CAN uses public shaming within UNFCCC when it 
awards the Fossil of the Day award in a daily ceremony to states that have not lived up 
to their mitigation promises or are blocking progress in the negotiations. These ceremo-
nies draw considerable attention by government delegates, nongovernmental representa-
tives and the media. Canada frequently received Fossil of the Day awards for the exploi-
tation of tar sands in Alberta and Germany for playing an overall leading role in the ne-
gotiations but re-labeling their official development aid as contribution to climate adap-
tation in developing countries.48 The awards are communicated by the government dele-
gations to their ministries and noted as negative publicity.49 
                                                        
47 Participant observation of demonstrations inside the negotiation center by Avaaz and Greenpeace, 
11/2009, Barcelona; and Fossil of the Day award ceremonies, 11/2009, Barcelona and 12/2009, Copenha-
gen, UNFCCC. 
48 Keck and Sikkink 1998, 23f; ENGO 2, 13/12/2009, Germany, 12/12/2009; and participant observation 
of Fossil of the Day award ceremonies in 11/2009, Bonn; and 12/2009, Copenhagen. 
49 Germany, 12/12/2009. 
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 Consequently, demonstrations can have an impact when ENGOs use strategies 
of civil regulation to blame and shame states by exposing their un-ambitious targets or 
contradictions between their actions and the positive image states try to communicate.50 
If this blaming and shaming by ENGOs endangers the positive image of climate leader-
ship a country wants to preserve, ENGO activities are noted by the responsible ministers 
and can lead to a rethinking of the negotiation position on the long term.51  
Indirect ENGO tactics reflecting information and strategic politics include position-
ing their messages in TV and Internet news, radio and newspaper. These are powerful 
tools to influence the discursive position of states on the long term via several negotia-
tion cycles. The stronger public opinion on a topic is and the more central demands for 
reducing emissions or proactive climate policy are in public debate, the more likely large 
political parties take up the topic and the higher the probability that ENGOs can succeed 
against the interests of the powerful fossil fuel lobby. 
 “Demonstrations are important, they force certain issues on the screens of the people 
at home. So when these demonstrations occur, like in Copenhagen on Saturday, the 
media loves that and the cameras capture the messages, and that is how the public is 
becoming aware of the negotiations and the issues”.52   
 
Demonstrations to the scale of civil disobedience and arrests for climate justice make 
headlines in the largest newspapers, such as the ENGO activists that spent Christmas 
2009 in prison. These demonstrations provide the platform to communicate the climate 
negotiations and the CAN demands on a strong, legally binding climate treaty to the 
wider public and electorates. Demonstrations push issues up the political agenda. This 
causal link explains why the expectations for the conference and public pressure 
expressed through the media that were deliberately pushed unrealistically high by 
                                                        
50 ENGO, member of CAN strategic planning committee, 14/12/2009; Keck and Sikkink 1998, 23ff.  
51 Interview Germany, 12/12/2009. 
52 AOSIS 2, 15/12/2009.  
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ENGOs media communications beforehand,53 motivated 110 heads of states to attend the 
climate change conference at short notice instead of sending their ministers dealing with 
climate change issues or special envoys. While the high-level profile of COP-15 was also 
owed to the efforts of governments, a comparison of the provisional list of participants 
with the actual list of participants for COP-15 reveals that many heads of states decided 
to attend at short notice. This indicates that activist ENGOs did have a considerable 
influence on the negotiation process. They did not change the negotiation position of 
states, but they framed climate change as danger requiring urgent action and pushed the 
climate change issue up the domestic agenda by organizing demonstrations drawing 
media attention. Decision makers react when they realize that their electorate is 
concerned about one issue and requires the government to take appropriate action. As a 
consequence, many governments and political parties developed national climate change 
strategies, established departments dealing with climate change mitigation and 
adaptation, and mainstreamed climate change into the wider public and political debate. 
If ENGOs succeed in convincing public opinion and the majority of voters, politicians in 
democracies can hardly afford to ignore their demands. This leads to changes in the 
national negotiation position over the long term. 
ENGOs’ activist strategies may have even contributed to saving the Copenhagen 
climate negotiations from a breakdown as the demonstrations and public attention raised 
the political costs of not reaching any agreement at the end of the conference.54 The 
public pressure on Parties to present “something” in agreement was substantial and 
contributed to the emergence of the Copenhagen Accords.  
 
In conclusion, demonstrations organized by ENGOs can lead to public attention,                                                         
53 Survey, 7/2010, London, LSE. 
54 Survey, 7/2010, London, LSE; personal conversation with nine government representatives, 2010/2011. 
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public pressure, and higher political stakes.55 In the case of ENGOs in 2009 before and at 
COP-15, the overall influence of activist strategies was moderate to high. ENGOs in 
Copenhagen demanded climate justice and a fair deal. These tangible, intuitively 
comprehendible messages united millions of people from different educational, 
professional and cultural backgrounds due to their simplicity. The protest against the low 
ambitions of governments and demonstrations demanding more ambitious targets and 
actions remained predominantly peaceful without turning into riots. This allowed media, 
who covered the negotiations favorably in their headlines, to frame the ten thousands of 
people from all over the world as peaceful and civilized citizens who had to endure 
overreacting police forces. Most countries regarded the number of people involved as 
concerned about climate change and as the majority of voters, giving them also a critical 
mass that suggested to heads of states that the political costs of failing to deliver an 
agreement were too high. Figure 7 summarizes the findings of moderate to high influence 
of activist strategies at COP-15. 
 
 
                                                        
55 Personal communication with eight senior level government representative, 04/2010 and 06/2011, 
Bonn, UNFCCC. 
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Conclusion on the low effectiveness of lobbying and the power of demonstrations 
 
This article analyzed the influence of advocacy NGOs using outsider-strategies 
at the example of ENGOs. They can pursue insider-strategies by joining government 
delegations as advisors or pursue outsider-strategies as either lobbyists or activists. EN-
GOs are organized as transnational advocacy ‘Climate Action Network’ and are putting 
pressure on the negotiators at climate change conferences, but especially on their gov-
ernments via media reports of mass demonstrations and public shaming.  
A process tracing of ENGO input to government representatives between 2009 
and 2011 reveals that lobbying government delegates at major conferences has little im-
pact as positions stand after having been decided on earlier by parliamental votes. An-
other difficulty facing environmental lobbyists is that they are not valued by government 
delegates as much for their expertise as academics are, due to their lack of neutrality and 
their clear advocacy position demanding something from the governments. Influence 
can be increased moderately by using strategies that establish them as policy entrepre-
neurs. It can be concluded from this analysis as implication for practice that the re-
sources and effort invested in lobbying government delegates at UNFCCC conferences 
is better used differently, either for highly effective advisory insider-strategies where 
ENGO representatives join government delegations,56 lobbying governments on the na-
tional level before positions are decided or demonstrations in connection with a strategic 
management of media relations.  
                                                        
56 For a detailed analysis of insider strategies used by academics and other NGOs, see Rietig, 2011. 
Figure 7.  
High influence of activ-
ists. Compiled by author.  
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The more influential outsider-strategy was, in the case of COP-15 2009, influ-
encing public opinion by media campaigns or organizing mass demonstrations and 
thereby raising the political costs of failing to agree on an outcome. This article present-
ed four indicators to assess the influence of activist NGOs on the negotiations. The mes-
sages must be clear, the demonstrations need to remain peaceful, the media coverage 
needs to be favorable and it is essential to exert public pressure on governments. A criti-
cal mass of people must participate representing the majority of the electorate.  
In the case of ENGOs at the Copenhagen Climate Conference, all indicators 
were fulfilled at a maximum, what indicates high influence of ENGOs using activist 
strategies at the negotiation meeting itself and on the long run. At the 2010 COP-16 in 
Cancun, ENGOs were present and active, but the disappointing outcome of COP-15 due 
to possibly unrealistically high expectations created by ENGOs beforehand, resulted in a 
loss of public interest. ENGOs were consequently less successful to leverage political 
pressure on decision makers. Media coverage was scarce and less favorable, not trans-
mitting the messages from the majority of voters. 
The analysis of the influence of NGO strategies is based on data gathered over 
three years (2009-2011). It allowed identifying a set of indicators for the influence of 
outsider-strategies on the negotiations in the form of an extension to the Betsill/Corell 
theoretical framework presented above. The theoretical implications are that influence of 
NGOs can not only be determined as high/moderate/low for an NGO constituency at a 
conference as offered by the Betsill/Corell framework, but that it can be further analyzed 
based on the strategies an NGO uses. In the same conference, ENGOs can have a high 
influence with activist strategies, but a low influence with lobbing strategies. This article 
contributed to a further development of analytical tools that allow measuring the influ-
ence of NGOs in climate negotiations with indicators based on their insider- or outsider 
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roles. The UNFCCC negotiations between 2009 and 2011 were typical for UNFCCC 
conferences on the diplomat level in the number of participating NGOs, the outcome of 
the negotiations and the effectiveness of participation. The high profile and expectations 
linked to the high-level-segment of the Copenhagen conference were less typical. This 
allowed for additional leverage of activist strategies, especially the high media attention, 
which is usually not available to activist NGOs if the expectations regarding the out-
come of the conference are very low to begin with, for example as COP-16 in Cancun or 
the 2012 COP-17 in Durban. If nongovernmental actors assess their strengths and strate-
gically use their capabilities in the areas where they can have the highest influence on 
the negotiations, they may contribute to further improving international environmental 
negotiations. As central actors in global environmental governance, civil society and its 
nongovernmental organizations play a central role in motivating and supporting states in 
their abilities to more effectively govern global environmental common goods. 
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COP-15, Copenhagen. 
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ing activities of CAN International. UNFCCC, COP-15, Copenhagen. 
 
ENGO 4. 14.12.2009. Interview with member of strategic planning committee of CAN 
on CAN’s activities, strategies and influence. UNFCCC, COP-15, Copenhagen. 
 
ENGO 5. 16.12.2009. Interview with lawyer in CAN legal unit on legal basis for lobby-
ing of CAN. UNFCCC, COP-15, Copenhagen. 
 
ENGO 6. 12.12.2009. Interview with member of European Youth Greens on activities 
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EU 1. 10.04.2010. Interview with Head of Section at a European countries’ Ministry of 
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Germany. 12.12.2009. Interview on how the German delegation perceives the 
roles, tactics and influence of NGOs. UNFCCC, COP-15, Copenhagen. 
 
Gore, A. 16.12.2009. Speech during Side Event of Al Gore on role of global civil socie-
ty in tackling the climate crisis. UNFCCC, COP-15, Copenhagen. 
 
Irland. 11.12.2009. Interview with representative of Ministry for Environment on how 
the Irish delegation and European Union perceives the roles, strategy and influence of 
NGOs. UNFCCC, COP-15, Copenhagen. 
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Japan. 12.12.2009. Interview with Japanese representative from research institute in the 
AWG-LCA on the role, strategies and influence of NGOs, especially of RINGOs. UN-
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Kerry, J. 16.12.2009. Speech during Side Event of Senator John Kerry on Climate 
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Latin America. 11.4.2010. Interview with senior level representative on how the Latin 
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LDC 2. 11.04.2010. Interview on the role of national ENGOs and the influence of inter-
national ENGOs and RINGOs on the Least-Developed-Countries position and the dy-
namics within the G77+China Group. UNFCCC, Bonn. 
 
Nigeria. 12.12.2009. Interview with representative of Nigerian Delegation on how least 
developed countries delegations are infiltrated by NGO experts and policy advisors from 
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RINGO 14.12.2009. Interview with Executive Director of American Research Institu-
tion on advisory role of NGOs, transnational/ transissue NGO networks and 
their impact on the negotiations. Copenhagen, UNFCCC, COP-15. 
 
Robinson, M. 16.12.2009. Speech of former Danish Prime Minister and UN High 
Commissioner on Human Rights on Climate Justice, ethics and the Copenhagen agenda: 
roles of institutions, civil society and markets. UNFCCC, COP-15, Copenhagen. 
 
Umbrella Group 1. 11.04.2010. Interview with representative of Umbrella Group mem-
ber (OECD country) at Bonn conference on the national position and the influence of 
RINGOs and ENGOs on the Umbrella Group. UNFCCC, Bonn. 
 
UAE. 12.12.2009. Interview with representative of United Arab Emirates on role of 
NGOs in Arab countries and of RINGOs in negotiations. UNFCCC, COP-15, Copenha-
gen. 
 
Vanuatu. 17.12.2009. Interview on cooperation between AOSIS and ENGOs/ RINGOs. 
UNFCCC, COP-15, Copenhagen. 
 
YOUNGO. 10.12.2009. Observation protocol of Youth Organizations NGO meeting on 
daily strategies and constituency coordination. UNFCCC, COP-15, Copenhagen. 
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Appendix 2: Survey questions  
Evaluation of the roles, strategies and influence of NGOs at COP-15 
 
 
 
1. Which role did your NGO take on in the negotiation? 
 
Advisory; Activist; Lobbyist; Observer/Networker; Other 
 
 
2. What activities did this role involve? 
 
- Advising government delegations with scientific expertise 
- Providing information to government delegations (publications, speeches at side events 
attended by government delegates) 
- Joining government delegations as advisor on policy field 
- Joining government delegations as negotiator  
- Demonstrations inside the conference centre  
- Demonstrations outside the conference centre  
- Lobbying of like-minded government delegations  
- Lobbying of government delegations with different negotiation objectives  
- Observing the negotiations 
- Networking with other NGO delegates  
- Visiting side events 
- Other 
 
3. On which level would you say was your NGO trying to influence the negotiations 
and with which intensity? 
 
 Very 
low in-
tensity 
Low in-
tensity 
 
Moderate 
intensity 
 
High in-
tensity 
 
Very high 
intensity 
 
N/A 
 
Agenda Setting       
Influence on discur-
sive positions of states 
      
Improve participation 
opportunities for 
NGOs 
      
Bring about policy 
change of central ac-
tors 
      
Influence the negotiat-
ing position of states 
      
 
4. What activities did your NGO undertake between January and December 2009 
to influence the agenda of the COP-15 prior to the conference? 
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5. What was your main issue of concern at the negotiations? 
 
6. Was there a shift in the general understanding of the issue between January 2009 
and December 2009 among the actors involved (states and NGOs)? 
 
6.a) Please specify how (from which starting point to what end view) the under-
standing of the issue changed 
 
7. What did your NGO do to bring about this shift in how the issue was under-
stood? 
 
8. Which strategies/ tactics did your NGO use to achieve its negotiation objectives? 
 
9.What were the initial negotiating positions of the key states you were in close con-
tact with? 
 
10. Did these key actors change their position during the negotiations?  
 
11. Do the Copenhagen Accords reflect your NGOs position about what should be 
done on the issue? 
 
12. Do the Copenhagen Accords contain text that has been drafted by your NGO?  
 
13. Do the Copenhagen Accords contain text that reflects your NGO’s negotiation 
objectives?  
 
14. How would you evaluate your NGOs influence on the negotiation process (Jan-
uary 2009 until December 18, 2009)? 
 
15. How (high or low) would you evaluate your NGOs influence on the negotiation 
outcome (the Copenhagen Accords)? 
 
16. Is your NGO accredited with the United Nations Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC)? 
 
- Yes 
- No 
- Don’t know 
- Other 
 
17. Did members of your NGO join government delegations?  
 
 
18. How many members did your delegation have (registered) at COP-15 in Co-
penhagen?  
 
19. How is your NGO funded?  
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20. What is the range of qualifications your delegates possess?  
 
21. Please rate your level of agreement with the following statements on the im-
portance for the negotiations: 
 
The experience of a delegate is important 
The high expertise of a delegate is important 
Excellent preparation is crucial 
The personality of a delegate is important 
The personal and professional network of a delegate is important 
The reputation of a delegate is important 
Financial resources are important 
A large number of delegates is important 
 
 
22. Is your NGO organized in a network of NGOs within your constituency?  
 
23.  
a) What common norms and values does this network share? 
b) How frequently does your NGO interact with other NGO members of this net-
work?  
c) What activities does this network involve?  
 
  Information sharing  
  Exchange of (academic) research findings 
- Collaboration on research projects 
- Exchange of delegates  
  Representation of one common position (negotiation bloc)  
  Pooling of resources  
  Common actions (demonstrations)  
  Sharing organizational capabilities  
  Other  
 
24. How often have representatives of your NGO attended COPs?  
 
25. Where do members of your NGO come from?  
